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Taking these cases as representative of at least an important tendency in the
American common law, there is a strong likelihood that the defendants would
have been liable had they been tried in an American court.28 For the agent
has been warned in the American decisions that even when simply executing
his principal's commands, his legal status does not secure him from all attacks.
The view in England being different, the problem of evaluation is provoked.
The English position accords well with the recent legislation, reducing generally the duty to the trust estate of those dealing with a trustee. Under the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act,29 a banker, a transfer agent for stocks, or one paying
money for goods or land to a trustee, is liable only when he knew he was taking
part in a breach, made a personal gain from the breach, or had actual knowledge
of facts which made it an act of bad faith for him to act as he did.30 Apparently
this legislation was stimulated by the necessity for facile administration of
trust estates. 3' If the importance of security in transactions is conceded to be
greater than protection of cestuis que trust, there seems to be no reasonable
basis for withholding from an agent of a trustee the protection supplied by the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act to other persons dealing with a trustee. Indeed, the
strong reasons 32 underlying the conceptual immunity of an agent who acts
within his authority afford both provocation and justification for extending the
statutory protection to agents of trustees.

TORT LIABILITY OF A CHARITABLE CORPORATION
The plaintiff, a paying patron at a ball game sponsored by the defendant,
was injured when a row of bleachers collapsed. Against the defendant's plea
that it was immune from tort liability as a charitable corporation, the plaintiff
agent. But since this court expressly declined to overrule Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 20
Ad. 343 (i89o) (brokers held liable because they had actual knowledge that they were dealing
with fiduciaries, though they did fiot know the terms of the trusts), it would seem that the
court admitted the general rule of liability should follow when the agent has actual knowledge
that trust funds are involved. The view of notice adopted by the Connecticut court in Titcomb v. Richter is approved by the California court in Northwestern Portland Cement Co. v.
Atlantic Portland Cement Co., i74 Cal. 308, 311, 163 Pac. 47, 49 (i917), but is adversely
criticized in 29 Harv. L. Rev. 232 (i915); Shaw v. Spencer, ioo Mass. 382, 393-94 (868). For
a general discussion of this question, see 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 894, 902 (935)
28 Unquestionably, the defendants were aware that their principal was a trustee; again,
there is no doubt of their knowledge that trust funds were involved. Not only had the defendants themselves drawn up the declaration of a trust, but they had it at all times in their
safe. Williams-Ashman v. Price and Williams, [1942] X Ch. 219, 221.
3' Note ii supra.
199 U.L.A. 297 (1942).
30 Notes 12-16 supra.
32 Consider this statement made by Lord Selbourne in Barnes v. Addy, L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244,

(1874): "If those principles were disregarded [viz., that an agent is liable only when he has
profited by or has acted despite actual knowledge of the breach], I know not how anyone
could, in transactions admitting of doubt as to the view which a Court of Equity might take of
them, safely discharge the office of solicitor, of banker, or of agent of any sort to trustees."
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argued that immunity should not be extended to an occasion for which there
was charged an entrance fee that was higher than it would appear necessary
to cover expenses, and that immunityshould not be granted to a charity which
had protected its funds by liability insurance. Trial in the circuit court resulted
in verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Held: Reversed. A corporation which
under its charter is to use all its income for the furtherance of a charitable purpose is immune from tort liability even though it charges a fee for admission to
the activity at which the tort occurred; to inform the jury, directly or indirectly,
that a defendant is insured against liability is improper. Myers v. Young Men's
ChristianAss'n.'
The Illinois courts have consistently insulated charitable corporations from
tort liability by adhering strictly to the view that the property acquired by a
charitable institution constitutes a trust fund which is not to be diverted from
its beneficent purpose to satisfy judgments resulting from the negligent acts of
its employees.2 Actually, as in the instant case, most charities are corporations
with complete ownership of their assets. Applied to such cases, the trust fund
doctrine appears as a judicial expression of policy notions favoring the protection of charities.3 In Illinois, while most attempts to narrow or eliminate the
rule of tort immunity have failed,4 some success was achieved at the trial court
stage in two recent cases. In one case, recovery was granted where the injured
party was a stranger to the charitable corporation.s In the other, the court refused to grant immunity to a charitable corporation which was protected by
liability insurance, as recovery would not lead to a reduction of the charitable
assets.6 However, the decision in the former case never reached an appellate
court;7 and as to the latter situation, the Appellate Court has adopted a con-

trary view in the instant case. While the Illinois courts have for the most part
144 N.E. (2d) 755 (Ill- App.

1942)-

Northwestern University, 218 I1. 381, 75 N.E. 99I (I9O5); Hogan v. Chicago
Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, x66 N.E. 461 (1929).
2Parks v.

32

Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 401 (i935).

4 A note in 6 Univ. Chi. L.Rev. 518 (1939) discussing the case of Maretick v. South Chicago
Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N.E. (2d) 1012 (1938), contains an analysis of the
Illinois cases. There the note writer indicated that except for a dictum in the case of Olander v.
Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930), where it was stated that a charitable corporation might be
liable if it failed to use due care in the selection of its servants, there has been no deviation by
the Illinois courts from the rule of tort immunity.

5 George Well Cartage Company v. Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth Corporation,
Cir. Ct. of Cook Co. (i939) (cited in 20 Chicago Bar Record 141 (1939)).
6 Shaleen v. The Newberry Library, Superior Ct. Cook Co. (1942) (cited in Survey of
Illinois Law for the Year 1941-1942, 21 Chicago-Kent. L. Rev. 1, 8 n. 45 (1942)).

7In Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, ioi N.E. 96o (1913), the city was liable for
the negligence of an employee of the public library board when the employee, who was driving
an automobile, collided with a third person. The theory of the court was that a municipal
corporation should discharge ministerial acts without negligence. The court gave no indication as to its decision had the defendant been a charitable rather than a municipal corporation.
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adhered rigorously to the rule of tort immunity, the charitable corporation is
not equally immune from actions for breach of contract.8 Thus, recovery of
contract damages will be permitted although it may result in a diversion of the
charitable funds. In the instant case, the plaintiff, by virtue of having paid
admission, was in contractual relationship with the defendant. It might well
be argued that the defendant had contracted to provide the plaintiff with
safe seating arrangements, and, in failing to do so, was liable for contractual
damages. However, in Illinois, recovery has been denied for breach of contract
if it resulted in a personal injury where the gist of the action was carelessness
by some servant. 9
As to the theoretical foundations of the immunity from tort liability, other
courts have resorted to various doctrines in addition to the trust fund doctrine,
which has served as a basis for the decisions of the Illinois courts. These doctrines include, i) non-applicability to a charitable institution of the doctrine
of respondeat superior; 2) implied waiver of liability on the part of a beneficiary
of a charitable institution; or, simply, 3) public policy in favor of such institutions, which seems to be the frankest statement of the rationale of the decisions.
In most jurisdictions, however, the immunity is not complete. Controversy is
provoked by the question of whether or not exceptions should be made in favor
of one or more groups, viz., strangers to the charity, paying beneficiaries, or
non-paying beneficiaries, and also by the question of whether or not the charitable institution should be charged with the acts of some particular type of
agents or employees.o The decisions, the various doctrines, and the criticisms
have been collected and discussed recently in a scholarly opinion by Associate
Justice Rutledge of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (now of
the United States Supreme Court), who states convincingly that continued
protection of charitable corporations from tort liability is justified by neither
legal theory nor public policy."
Ideally, the fujiction of tort law is to provide the machinery for efficient
distribution of loss. Courts concerned themselves primarily with notions of
"fault," and the evolution of the modern law of torts has proceeded along these
lines.12 But courts have also shown a tendency to impose liability upon certain
8
Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912); Ward v. St. Vincent Hospital,
39 App. Div. 624, 57 N.Y. Supp. 784 (1899).

9 Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N.E. (2d) 314 (1942). But
see Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 IlL. App. Sr (1912).
10 Thus, for example, a beneficiary-particularly a non-paying one-is frequently denied
recovery where the negligent act was committed by a servant of the charity. On the other
hand, a stranger to the charity is often permitted to recover under similar circumstances.
11President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F. (2d) 8io (App. D. C.
1942).

2 See Kendall v. Brown, 6o Mass. 250 (x85o). It is generally recognized that so long as the
"fault" notion continues to constitute the principal basis for liability in tort, risks and

losses will frequently fail to be distributed satisfactorily. But while a relaxation of the fault
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entrepreneurs who have merely created the risk and are deemed to be best
able to sustain or distribute the loss. 3 Extending the rule of respondeat superior, courts have frequently thwarted the efforts of employers to insulate
themselves from tort liability by employing an independent contractor, 4 or by
acting through a subsidiary corporation.' s The legislatures, in the workmen's
compensation acts, reflect the same desire to distribute loss effectively. Dissatisfied with the frequent irresponsibility of the individual motorist, moreover,
they have provided in some instances for compulsory automobile insurance and
in others for proof of financial responsibility, 6 thereby giving adventitious emphasis to the necessity for a broader basis of loss distribution. A judicial expression of the same desire is found in the family car doctrine. Even the stronghold of government tort immunity has been severely attacked, 7 and numerous
inroads have been made. 8 These trends indicate that both courts and legislatures are concerned about the one who has suffered a loss, and that immunity
from tort liability ought to be regarded as justified only in the face of strongly
compelling factors.
The anomalous position of the remediless beneficiary of a charity is particularly difficult to justify. Associate Justice Rutledge, in criticizing the retention
of immunity in the case of the non-paying beneficiary, properly stated: "He,
least of all, is able to bear the burden. More than all others, he has no choice.
He is the last person the donor would wish to go without indemnity."'9 The
dictates of social policy may have at one time required an occasional individual
to suffer so that the public in general might enjoy undiminished the bequests
to private philanthropies. Fear that donors might be deterred from making
notion may well constitute an ultimate goal, the existing tort machinery should be refined
to ease the burden of individual loss in the interim. Compare, James, Contribution among
Joint Tort Feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. xi56 ('94'), with Gregory,
Contribution among Joint Tort Feasors: A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1'70 (1941).
13 See Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort
Cases, 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 8o5 (1930); Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 729 (1941).
14 See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 501(1935).
XSCostan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow
Cab Co., 178 Okla. I, 6I P. (2d) 645 (1936).
166 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice §§ 3851-58 (i935); Engel,

Discharge in Bankruptcy as "Satisfaction" under Automobile Responsibility Statutes, 5 U.
of Pitt. L. Rev. 26, 28 n. 10 (1939).
'7Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Borchard,
The Federal Torts Claims Bill, i Univ. CM. L. Rev. i (1933).
ISKeifer & Keifer v. RFC., 3o6 U.S. 381 (i939). As to proposed federal legislation, see
Armstrong and Cokcrill, The FederaLTorts Claims Bill, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 327 (1942).

The proposed bill has now been committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union. S. 222i, 7 7 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942).
'9 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,

D.C.

1942).

13o

F. (2d) 8io, 827 (App.
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charitable bequests, or that bequests once made would be dissipated in litigation, was the rationale behind most of these decisions.20
Now, however, many of the functions formerly performed exclusively by
charities are supplemented by government-supported institutions. Furthermore, charitable corporations of today are conducted more nearly along the
lines of private enterprises than were their earlier counterparts. Often, indeed,
the organization is to a considerable extent supported by paying patrons, as
is the defendant corporation in the instant case. Again, liability insurance is
available as an effective medium for the distribution of loss; the charitable corporation is thus in a position to pass on the premium, at least in part, to its
paying beneficiaries. In the instant case, the plaintiff's attempt to show that
the corporation would be indemnified by liability insurance presented the court
with the choice of either relaxing the rule of tort immunity where the charitable
fund was protected by insurance21 and thereby making it advantageous for
charitable corporations not to insure, or applying the rule of full tort immunity
without regard for the fact that presence of insurance had rendered this protection unnecessary. As long as the present rule of immunity prevails, it seems
a sheer waste of money for a charitable corporation to purchase protection.The abolition of tort immunity would still leave charities in a preferred position when compared with private corporations. For example, the growth of
charities is fostered by various exceptions to the rule against remoteness and
to the rules against restraints on alienation and accumulations.23 Moreover, in
their taxation policies, legislatures favorably regard gifts and legacies to charities, as well as the property owned by charities.24 The costs of these advan20 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 38r, 75 N.E. 99 (i9o5). But this policy notion has not been extended to the gratuitous acts of private individuals, who are held to the
same standard of care as a person performing the act for consideration. Harper, Torts § 8i

(1933).
"The court in the instant case expressly refused to follow the case of O'Connor v. Boulder
Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, io5 Coo. 259, 96 P. (2d) 835 (i935), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
567 (194o), where it was held that if the charitable fund were protected from depletion by
insurance there was no immunity under the trust fund theory against -anaction sounding in
tort. The Illinois court bqsed its refusal on the ground that the jury should resolve questions
of liability apart from a consideration of the presence in the background of an insurance company. Actually, thd plaintiff merely sought the abolition of a rule of immunity which precluded any consideration of liability. That this clearly would not determine liability is indicated in the O'Connor case, where the plaintiff on the next round failed to recover damages
by failing to prove negligence. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, I07 Coo. 290,
XII P. (2d) 633 (i941).
22 3 Scott, Trusts and Trustees § 402 (i939).
23 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 349, 350, 353 (1935). Under a statute similar to the
Thellusson Act, it appears that in Illinois a charitable corporation will be treated the same as
a private one so far as the rule against accumulations is concerned. Ill. Rev. Stat. (x941)
c. 30, § 153.
24 A recent judicial discussion of the exemption of charitable corporations from taxation
can be found in International Reform Fed. v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 131 F. (2d)
337 (App. D.C. 1942).
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tages are spread over the entire community, while the rule of tort immunity
places the loss squarely on a single individual. Clearly, charitable corporations
should, as do private corporations, bear the cost of their tortious acts, and the
rule of tort immunity which leaves an undeserved loss on an unfortunate individual should be abolished.

SECONDARY BOYCOTT UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
AND NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
Local 306 of the Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, threatened to
strike Loew's New York distributing center and, through its national union, to
strike Loew's production plant on the west coast, unless Loew's agreed to supply
films only to Manhattan theatres unionized by Local 306. Similar demands
were to be made on seven other leading distributors2 thus threatening a virtual
suspension of the entire film industry, if this agreement were not signed. Loew's
sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment outlawing the requested agreement under the Sherman Act. Held, relief granted as requested. Loew's, Inc. v.
3
Basson.
Despite the court's holding to the contrary, it seems clear that there was a
labor dispute between the parties under the Norris-LaGuardia Act4 and that
therefore the injunction should not have issued. The court stated that the demands of the union bore "no reasonable relation to wages, hours, health, safety,
working conditions, or the right of collective bargaining," and that they were
not directed toward any "normal" or "lawful" labor objective.5 But in so reasoning the courtobviously relied too much on the fact that the union has no
quarrel with the company concerning its own employment standards and neglected the importance to the union of the economic support which the company
lends to non-organized or rival-organized theatres by continuing its present
contracts. Furthermore, the court, in saying that the objective must be "normal" and "lawful," is reading a qualification into the statute. State courts have
sometimes done this with their "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts,"' 6 but it is far
I An affiliate of the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, A.F.L.
2 Columbia Pictures Corp., Paramount Pictures, Inc., R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., United Artists Corp., Universal Pictures Co., Inc., and
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.
346 F. Supp. 66 (N.Y.
4 "The

1942).

term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange employment....'" § 13(c), 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C.A. § 113(c) (1942).
5Loew's, Inc. v. Basson, 46 F. Supp. 66, 71 (N.Y. 1942).
6This tendency has been especially marked in New York. American Guild of Musical
Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E. (2d) 123 (194T); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber,
285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941), noted in 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 170 (I94I).

